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THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES.
O N November 4, 1912 the Supreme Court of the United States,
'by formal order, adopted and established a code of rules for
the courts of equity of the United States, which should take
the place of all rules theretofore prescribed by the Supreme Court
and then in force. Rule 8i provides: "These rules shall be in force
on and after February I, 1913, and shall govern all proceedings in
cases then pending or thereafter brought, save that where in any
then pending cause an order has been made or act done which can-
not be changed without doing substantial injustice, the court may
give effect to such order or act to the extent necessary to avoid any
such injustice. All rules theretofore prescribed by the Supreme
Court, regulating the practice in suits in equity, shall be abrogated
when these rules take effect."
In pursuance of said order the rules so promulgated now regu-
late the procedure in the federal courts of equity.
Yielding to a request which he is willing to regard as a demand
for the discharge of an obligation, the writer ventures to submit
some observations on the authority for making said rules, the oc-
casion of their making, the manner in which the work was done,
and the changes wrought by them in the equity procedure of the
federal courts.
Statutory Authorization of Courts to Adopt Rules of Procedure.
The Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, provided: "That all
said courts of the United States shall have power * * * to
make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting
business in the said courts, provided such rules are not repugnant
to the laws of the United States."'1
By act entitled, "An act to regulate Processes in the Courts of
the United States" approved September 29, 1789, Congress made
specific provisions as to the procedure in said Courts in these words:
"That until further provisions shall be made, and, except where by
this act or other statutes of the United States is otherwise provided,
the forms of writs and executions * * * in the circuit and
district courts, in suits at common law, shall be the same in each
state respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts
of the same. And the forms and modes of proceedings in causes
I Stat. At. L. 83.
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of equity, and of admirality and of maritime jurisdiction, shall be
according to the course of the civil law." 2
This latter act is supplementary to the Judiciary Act of Septem-
ber 24, 1789. Its-purpose was to direct, temporarily, and until
further provision should be made by rules, the procedure in the
said courts. The statute is mentioned in this connection because it
shows the inclination of the First Congress that proceedings on the
law side of the court should be conducted in conformity with the
practice in the respective states, but on the equity side of the court
in conformity with the practice of the English Court of Chancery,
and further because reference is made to this act in the ensuing
legislation on the subject. This act by its terms was to continue
in force until the end of the next session of Congress and no
longer.
The Second Congress by act approved May 8, 1792, entitled,
"An act for regulating Processes in the Courts of the United
States etc." provided: "That the forms of-writs, executions and
other process except their style, and the forms and modes of pro-
ceedings in-suits in those of common law shall be the same as are
now used in the said Courts respectively in pursuance of the act
entitled 'An act to-regulate processes in the courts" of the United
States'; in those of equity and those of 6dmiralty and maritime
jurisdiction according to the principles, rules and usages which
belong to the Court of Equity and to the Courts of Admirality respec-
tively as contradistinguished from courts of common law: except
so far as may have been provided by the act to establish the judicial
courts of the United States, subject, however, to such alterations
and additions as the said courts respectively shall in their discretion
deem expedient or to such regulations as the Supreme Court of the
United States shall think from time to time by rule to prescribe to
any circuit or district Court concerning the same. *- * * 3
The Twentieth Congress by act approved May i9, 1828, entitled
"An act to regulate processes in the courts of the United States' 4
extended the provisions of the Act of May 8, 1792 to the Courts of
the United States held in those states admitted into the Union
after May 29, 1792, but did not abridge or enlarge the power and
authority of the Supreme Court to adopt rules, as the same was
conferred by the Act of May 28, 1792. It may be said, however,
that the Act of May 29, 1828 added strength to the manifest dis-
position of the Congress that in actions at law the procedure in the
2 x Stat. At. L. 93-94.
3 x Stat. At. TI. 276.
'4 Star. At. -L. 2z78.
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federal courts should, as near as might be, conform to the procedure
then used in the highest court of original and general jurisdiction in
the state wherein the federal court was held.
The Twenty-seventh Congress by act approved August 23, 1842,
entitled, "An act further supplementary to an act entitled 'An act
to establish the Judicial Courts of the United-States' passed the
twenty-fourth of September, seventeen hundred and eighty nine"
provided: § 6. "That the Supreme Court shall have full power
and authority, from time to time, to prescribe and regulate and
alter the forms of writs and other process to be used and issued in
the district and circuit courts of the United States, and the forms
and modes of framing and filing libels, bills, answers and other
proceedings and pleadings in suits at common law or in admiralty
and equity pleading in the said courts, and also the forms and
modes of taking and obtaining evidence and of obtaining discovery
and generally the forms and modes of proceeding to obtain relief,
and the forms and modes of drawing up, entering and enrollihig'de-
crees, and the forms and modes of proceeding before trustees ap-
pointed by the Court, so as to prevent delays and to promote brevity
and succinctness in all pleadings and proceedings therein, and to
abolish all unnecessary costs and expenses in any suit. -
The substance of the foregoing section is embodied in the Revised
Statutes and stands therein as § 917. The phraseology of § 917
differs in some unimportant particulars from that of § 6, of the Act
of August 23, 1842.
And so stands the legislation authorizing the Supreme Court of
the United States t6 promulgate rules, from time to time, to regulate
the procedure in the federal courts of equity.
It is apparent, from the acts above referred to, that the Congress
gave direction to procedure both in the courts of common law and in
the courts of equity; in the former the procedure was destined to be
as varied as the several states might direct in respect to their own
courts of original and general jurisdiction; in the- latter as constant
or staid as the action or inaction of the Supreme Court might in-
cline. In respect to procedure in the courts of equity, the acts
above referred to have been generally understood to adopt the
principles, rules and usages of the Courts of Chancery of England.
It was held at a comparatively early day that Congress had by
the Constitution exclusive authority to regulate the proceedings
in the courts of the United States and might delegate that power to
the courts themselves.'
5 5 Stat. At. T,. S16.
6 It was so ruled as to the Act of May 8, 1792. Hinde v. Vattier, S Pet. 398.
Wayman v. Southard, zo Wheat 1, 41.
437
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Formulation of Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the
United States.
It has already appeared that, by the Act of September 29, 1789,
Congress made provision for the general, but temporary, regulation
of processes in the courts of the United Ctates. The act itself sug-
gests that Congress expected, if it did not enjoin, that further pro-
vision should be made to regulate the processes in said courts be-
fore the end of the next ensuing Congress, because, by its own terms,
the act was to continue in force only to that time. The expectation
or injunction of Congress, whichever it may have been, or .whether
it really existed, or has been fancifully inferred, was soon realized
or promptly obeyed. At an early period after the organization of
the federal courts each of them adopted rules for the regulation
of practice therein, with special reference to the practice of the state
courts. At that time the English practice generally prevailed."
The rules prescribed by the equity courts themselves, under the
sanction of the statute,, continued to guide their practice down to
July I, 1822.
The Supreme Court of the United States, within the February
term 1822, prescribed and promulgated rules of practice for the
courts of equity of the United States. Those rules were thirty-
three in number. The court ordered that said rules be the rules of
practice for the courts of equity of the United States, from and after
-the first day of July then next ensuing. Rule 33 provided: "In all
cases where the rules prescribed by this court or by the circuit court
do not apply, the practice of the circuit court shall be regulated by
the practice of the High Court of Chancery in England." These
rules are to be found in 7 Wheat. xvii-xxi. They continued in force
for a period of twenty years, when they were superseded by rules
prescribed and promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1842. The
rules of 1842 were directed to go into effect on the first of August
of that year. In these rules we again find reference to the practice
of the High Court of Chancery in England and a direction that its
practice shall be followed so far as it may reasonably be applied con-
sistently with the local circumstances and local convenience of the
district where the court is held, not as positive rules, but as furnish-
ing just analogies to regulate the practiceY
8 Anonymous, i Peters C. C. R. s.
' Rule XC.
The rules of x842 were originally published in 17 Peters, an unofficial volume not
found in the ordinary collection of the United States Supreme Court Reports. They
appear in Vol. 2o L. Edn. 9io et seq. Reference is made in various places to the fact
that these rules were published in a How. The law library of the University of Michigan
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Provision was made that any circuit court might in its discretion
adopt these rules, which were promulgated March 2, 1842, previous
to the time when, by the terms of the rules, they were to take effect,
namely August i, 1842, and when, and as soon as these rules shall
so take effect and be in force, the rules promulgated in 1822 shall,
henceforth, cease and be of no further force or effect.10
The rules of 1842, with some modifications, amendments and ad-
ditions, continued to be the rules regulating the practice in the equity
courts of the United States down to the going into effect of the New
Federal Equity Rules February I, 1913. 1'
They were molded, in the forms of the English Chancery prac-
tice. Some of them may be followed back to the hundred rules of
Lord BACON, the foundation of the practice of the Court of Chan-
cery; many of them are traceable directly to the later rules of the
English Chancery Court; all of them were based upon the practice
embraces two sets of what purports to be the official reports of the Supreme Court of
the United States in neither of which are the said rules printed in 1 How.
"0 This provision stood as rule 92 but, that rule not being a rule of practice, but
simply a direction as to the taking effect of the rules and being of no force or effect
after August 1, 1842, was not included in the subsequent numbering of the rules.
uThe rules of x842 were amended, modified and added to, as follows:
Rule x3 was amended May 3, 1875. 2z Wall v. The amendment consisted in
providing that the subpoena under certain circumstances might be left, "with some
adult person" whereas the original provided that it might be left, "with some free
white person." just the difference between x842 and 1875.
Rules r8 and xg were amended October 28, 1878. 97 U. S. viii. The amendment to
rule x8 relates to the time when a decree may be entered upon a bill taken as confessed,
and fixes that time at any time after the expiration of thirty days from and after the
entry of the order that the bill be taken pro confesso, whereas the original fixed the
time "at the next ensuing terin of the court." The amendment in rule xg is of similar
import.
Rule 40 was repealed and annulled by order of the court in the December term, x85o,
and this provision was made as a substitute for rule 40. "And it shah not, hereafter,
be necessary to interrogate a defendant specially and particularly upon any statement in
the bill, unless the complainant desires to do so, to obtain a discovery." The original
rule provided: "That a defendant shall not be bound to answer any statement or
charge in the bill unless specially and particularly interrogated thereto."
Rule 41 was amended March 6, 1872, 13 Wall. d. The original and the amended
rule related to interrogatories put to the defendant; neither is important now.
Rule 67 provided for taking of testimony and originally consisted of a single
paragraph. This was amended December term 1854. 17 How. vii. Five paragraphs
were added December term s86z, x Black 6, amended October term 189o, 139 U. S.
707. Another paragraph was added December term x869, 9 Wall. viii; another May 2,
1892, x44 U. S. 689; another May z5, 1893, 149 U. S. 792.
Rule 82 was amended April z6, 1894, xs United States 709. The rule relates to
the appointment of standing and special masters in Chancery, their duties and compen-
sation. The following rules were added to those promulgated in 1842:
Rule 92 was promulgated April x8, 1864, x Wall. vii.
Rule 93 was promulgated January 13, r879. 97 U. S. vii.
Rule 94 was promulgated January 23, 1882. 104 U. S. ix.
See Hopkins' New Federal Equity Rules 66-141.
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of that court, a practice which curiously enough was retained in
the place of its adoption long after it had been abandoned in the
home- of its origin. And lest the specific rules should fail in any way
sufficiently to provide for a close following of the English practice,
a general rule was added, as heretofore observed, directing in the
first instance (Rules of 1822) that "in all cases where the rules.
prescribed by this court * * * do not apply, the practice in
the Circuit Courts shall be regulated by the practice of the High
Court of Chancery in England ;" in the second instance, (Rules of
1842) that "in all cases where the rules prescribed by this court
* * * do not apply, the practice of the Circuit Court shall
be regulated by the present practice of the High Court of Chancery
in England, so far as the same may be reasonably be applied con-
sistently with the local circumstances and local convenience of the
District where the Court is held, not as positive rules, but as fur-
nishing just analogies to regulate the practice."'
1 2
These rules had, and the new rules which have superseded them
will have, all the force and effect of law, and were and will be bind-
ing as such upon all suitors before the court. The government it-
self was not and will not be exempt from their operation and con-
trol. This results from the well recognized and conceded fact,
that when the United States voluntarily comes into its courts seek-
ing relief against an individual, it comes not as a sovereign, but as
a suitor, and although it is the creator of the court and the foun-
tain head from which all rules of procedure issue, it stands before
the Court in the same light as any other suitor.'
13
The Occasion for New Rides.
The rules of I842, with their amendments and additions, were
doubtless suited to the times of their adoption. The source from
which they prang, the practice on which they were founded-the
practice of a court which had reached a high state of efficiency not
only by reason of its great age, but more by reason of the distin-
guished ability of the eminent chancellor who gave its procedure
2 "The present practice of the High Court of Chancery in England," said the Court
in Thomson v. Wooster, 124 U. S. 104, 22, "which by our roth Rule was adopted as the
standard of equity practice in cases where the rules prescribed by this court * * do
not apply" is exhibited in the ist edition of Daniell (published 1837) and the 2nd edition
of Smith's Chancery Practice(published the same year). These were the most authoritative
works on English Chancery practice in use in March 1842, when our Equity Rules were
adopted. The practice as exhibited by these works was supplemented by the general
orders made by Lords Cottenham and Langdale in August 1841, many of which were
closely copied in our rules.
21 United States v. Barber Lumber Co. et al., x69 Fed. 184, x86.
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direction, and of its successive chancellors,-the inherent appro-
priateness of the rules themselves, warrant the conclusion that they
were as good as any that could have been adopted. On the whole
they served their purpose well. But long since, they became the
subject of dissatisfaction and criticism. They were charged with
being unsuited to the growing and changing conditions. The pro-
cedure which they prescribed was declared to be too cumbersome,
too slow, too expensive. The natural and judicious conservatism
of the Supreme Court operated to prevent its lending a too ready
or too willing ear to complaints and criticisms of a system which
had existed without substantial change for a period of seventy
years-really for quite a century,--a system to which the bar had
become accustomed by long usage and which was quite well under-
stood through construction in numerous cases where the procedure
had been challenged as doubtful or dubious. A fixed practice ap-
peals to bench and bar alike. Precedent is the very citadel of those
who are ruled by the common law as well as of those who are con-
cerned with its administration and enforcement. It is proper that
we should, and a verity that we do, in all our public concerns, give
heed to the wholesome maxim so aptly expressed in our great
Declaration. "Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long
established should not be changed for light and transient causes;
accordingly all experiences hath shown, that mankind are more
disposed to suffer while evils axe sufferable, than to right them-
selves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed". The
legitimate offspring of this principle was the disposition that in-
duced a retention of the rules of 1842, as modified from time to
time, long after their inappropriateness to existing conditions had
been pointed out by lawyer and layman, long after the procedure
which they prescribed had been simplified in the court from which
it was borrowed. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the old
rules was the prime occasion for prescribing the new.
How the Nezp Rules were Formulated.
The power to revise the rules of procedure in the federal courts
of equity is lodged exclusively in the Supreme Court. The New
Federal Equity Rules emanted from that Court. But the formula-
tion of these rules was the work of a committee composed of forty-
five members. The Supreme Court was represented on the com-
mittee by the Chief Justice and Justices LuRTON and VAN DxVAN-
TER. The several circuit courts of appeals were requested to ap-
point, and did appoint, members of the bar within their respective
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circuits to cooperate with the Supreme Court or its committee in
the formulating of revised rules of practice. The committee as
finally made up, included, aside from the representatives of the
Supreme Court, forty-three members of the bar, conspicuous in
their respective circuits for their professional learning and ability
and for their aptitude for the special work by reason of their ex-
perience as practitioners in the federal courts. The first circuit
was represented on the committee by three members, the
second by nine, the third by six, the fourth by three, the fifth by
six, the sixth by four, the seventh by four, the eighth by three, and
the ninth by five. It may be taken'for granted that the committee
as constituted would reflect the ideas and sentiments, pertaining to
the general subjects, of the whole country, and as a whole would be
able to choose and recommend for adoption the best features of'
procedure. The Supreme Court had not, prior to this time, at least
in any formal or significant way, called to its aid in work of -like
character the services of representatives of the 'bar of the country.
On the committee were representatives of practice under the code,
prepared to urge for adoption whatever was of substantial value
under that practice. There were also representatives of practice
in jurisdictions where the common law courts and equity courts
were separate and distinct tribunals, competent to point out whatever
was of advantage in a complete separation of common law courts
and equity courts and what should be retained and what abandoned
of the old system of equity procedure. There were also representa-
tives of practice in jurisdictions where the distinction between com-
mon law actions and suits in equity was maintained, but in courts
presided over by the judge or by the chancellor as the nature of
the business in hand might require, qualified to suggest whatever
was meritorious in the particular procedure under that system.
Probably no feature of practice followed in any state in the union
was unrepresented in the committee as it was constituted. The
present English procedure was carefully examined. Mr. justice
LuRToN, representative of the Supreme Court, visited England-
with the view of studying that procedure in its actual operation.
He consulted the Lord Chancellor and received from him valuable
suggestions,sa the result of which is that many of the features of
the English procedure are adopted in the new rules. Members of
the committee from the several circuits made suggestions which
were considered and adopted or rejected as seemed to the entire
committee best. The manner in which the work of revision was
ma Hopkins' Nev Federal Equity Rules, 27 et seq.
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done, the character and ability of the men who had it in charge,
the adoption of the recommendations of the committee by the Su-
preme Court, leaves no cause for doubt that the new rules embody
the best thought of the bench and the bar of the country in the mat-
ter of what, in view of all the circumstances, should be the proper
procedure of the equity courts of the government.
Changes in Procedure made by the New Rules.
It is not within the purpose or scope of this article to consider in
detail the changes in procedure made by the new rules. Anything
more than a brief review of the more radical and significant
changes will not be attempted. But the writer feels that that is
enough, arid that he can be of service to the readers of this review
who will heed his advice to read the new rules and study them in
comparison with the old, and not by submitting his own comments
upon them.14 First of all it will be'observed that the great funda-
mentals of former rules are preserved. The court of equity stands
as it did stand. The distinction between actions at law and suits
in chancery is not disturbed. The procedure of the court is simplif-
ied. The old and unimportant distinctions are eliminated, archaic
forms are discouraged. Procedure which tends to or results in
delay is abolished, and in its place is substituted a procedure better
calculated to speed the cause to issue and to determination. The
changes made contemplate less delay and less expense.
Many of the new rules are identical or substantially identical
with former rules. In this class may be included rules 7, 9, II, 13,
14, 15, 17, 27, 35, 40, 41, 42, 44, 6o, 63, 64, 65, 70, 71, 74, anO 78.
Of the eighty rules constituting the new code, twenty-one are sub-
stantially identical with. former rules. Many of the former rules
are included in substance in the new rules, with such minor changes
in arrangement and phraseology as would exclude them from the
identical and substantially identical class. In this class are rules-
10, 19, 54, 59, 61, 62, 66, 68, 69, and 72. The remaining rules are
in part founded upon and adopted from the rules regulating the
present practice in the court of chancery in England. Some few
of the number are new or original in the respect that they are so
much a departure from the form and substance of the English
rules that decisions on the latter would not be safe precedents for
the construction of the former.
14 The rules are published in full, x98 Federal, xLx-xli; 33 Sup. Ct. vii-xliii; Hopldns'
New Federal 4quity Rules, 1913; Callaghan & Co.'s Reprint 1913.
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As to Pleadings.
The technical forms of pleadings in equity are abolished. (Rule
i8.)
The court may at any time, in furtherance of justice, upon such
terms as may be just, permit any process, proceeding, pleading or
record to be amended, or material supplemental matter to be set
forth in an amended or supplemental pleading. The court, at every
stage of the proceeding, must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the par-
ties. (Rule 19). This mandatory provision which closes the fore-
going rule is of striking significance. The substance must never be
sacrificed'to the form. The livery in which the suitor appears is
made unimportant by the imperative provisions of the rule.
A further and better statement of the nature of the claim or de-
fense, or further and better particulars of any matter stated in any
pleading, may in any case be ordered, upon such terms as to costs
and otherwise, as may be just. (Rule 2o).
The right to except to bills, answers and other proceedings for
scandal or impertinence shall not obtain, but the court may, upon
motion or its own initiative, order any redundant, impertinent or
scandalous matter stricken out, upon such terms as the court shall
think fit. (Rule 2i).
If at any time it appear that a suit commenced in equity should
have been brought as an action on the law side of the court, it shall
be forthwith transferred to the law side and be there proceeded with,
with only such alteration in the pleadings as shall be essential.
(Rule 22).
If in a suit in equity a matter ordinarily determinable at law arises,
such matter shall be determined in that suit according to the prin-
ciples applicable, without sending the case or question to the law
side of the court. (Rule 23).
These several provisions are new. They are based upon analogous
rules of the English chancery practice. They effect material changes
in the course of procedure in the federal equity courts.
Every bill or other pleading shall be signed individually by one or
more solicitors of record and such signature shall be considered as
a certificate by each solicitor that 'he has read the pleading so signed
by him; that upon the instructions laid before him regarding the
case there is good ground for the same; that no scandalous matter
is inserted in the pleading; and that it is not interposed for delay.
(Rule 24).
This rule embodies in its provisions former rule 24 which required
that the bill only should be signed by counsel "As an affirmation on
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his part that * * * there is good ground for the suit." The
signature of counsel to all pleadings is required as a voucher that
the defense is not fictitous or collusive as well as "that the case is
not a mere fiction."
Rule 25 deals with the bill of complaint. It is a substitute for the
matter contained in former rules 2o, 21, 22, 23, and 24. It provides:
"Hereafter it shall be sufficient that a bill of equity shall contain in
.addition to the msual caption:
"First, the full name, when known, of each plantiff and defendant
and the citizenship and residence of each party. If any party be
under any disability that fact shall be stated." (The address or
salutation made imperative by former rule 20 is not required, but
it may be dotbtful whether the language of the rule is tantamount
-to a prohibition of its use.)
"Second,a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which
the court's jurisdiction depends".
"Third, a short and simple statement of the ultimate facts upon
which the plaintiff asks relief, omitting any mere statement of evi-
dence." (This provision is evidently the offspring of a desire to
-avoid unnecessary prolixity in the framing of bills, but it embodies
only what has long been recognized as a fundamental rule of equIty
pleading.1 5 ).
"Fourth, if there are persons other than those named as defendants
who appear to be proper parties, the bill should state why they are
not made parties-as that they are not within the jurisdiction of
the court or cannot be made parties without ousting the jurisdic-
15 In his comments on this provision Mr. Hopkins says: "But it makes no provision
for those recitals of conditions precedent that have been held essential to the sufficiency
,of bills for patent infringement, and the like. Does the third paragraph of Rule 2s
mean to dispense with such recitals? It is by no means clear. It would have been clear
and unequivocal had the rule been drawn as suggested by the Bar Committee appointed
'by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reads as follows:
"Provide that it shall be sufficient in pleading a judgment or other determination
of a court, or of an officer of special jurisdiction, or a patent, or other public grant, to
allege that it was duly made or issued; that in pleading the performance of conditions
-precedent in a contract, it shall be sufficient to state that the party duly performed all
the conditions on his part; and that it shall not be sufficient in any case herein mentioned
to deny the allegation generally, but the facts relied upon must be specifically stated."
"This rule is suggested, because it has been held on the circuit that it is not
sufficient, in a bill for the infringement of a patent, to allege that the patent was duly
issued, but that it is necessary to aver all the facts on which authority to issue the
patent depends. The result -is that bills in such cases are unnecessarily prolix."
As is has been repeatedly held that the recital of conditiohs precedent is not-a "mere
statement of evidence," and as the rule of stating ultimate facts has always obtained, it
is the writer's opinion that the third paragraph -of Rule 21 does not relieve the pleader
-of the necessity of pleading such conditions precedent, precisely as heretofore.
Hopkins' New Federal Equity Rules, pp. zr8-r59.
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tion." (This provision is substantially a repetition of former rule
22.)
"Fifth, a statement of and prayer for any special relief pending
the suit or on final hearing, which may be stated and sought in al-
ternative forms. If special relief pending the suit be desired the
bill should be vertified by the oath of the plaintiff or someone hay-
knowledge of the facts upon which such relief is- asked."
The prayer for subpoena is not required. The preceding rule 12
provides that when the bill is filed the clerk shall issue the process
of subpoena thereon, as of course, upon the application of the plain-
tiff.
Under former rule 23 a bill was demurrable which omitted a prayer
for process, and the clerk was without authority to issue a subpoena
thereunder. It is provided -by Rule 26 that the plaintiff may join in
one bill as many causes of action, cognizable in equity, as he may have
against the defendant. If there be more plaintiffs than one, the
causes of action joined must be joint; if there be more defendants
than one, the liability must be one asserted against all of the mater-
ial defendants, or sufficient grounds must appear for uniting the
causes of action in order to promote the convenient administration
of justice. If it appear that any such causes of action cannot be
conveniently disposed of together, the court may order separate
trials. Rule 26 is adapted from the English rule covering analagous.
subjects. This rule is aimed at the uncertain and vexatious objec-
tion relating to multifariousness.
Rule 28 provides that the plaintiff may amend his bill as of course
at any time before the defendant has responded thereto, but after
pleading filed by the .defendant, only by consent of the defendant
or leave of the court or judge.
Demurrers and pleas are abolished by Rule 29, which provides
further; "Every defense in point of law arising upon the face of
the bill, whether for misjoinder, non-joinder or insufficiency of fact
to constitute a valid cause of action in equity, which might hereto-
fore have been made by demurrer or plea, shall be made by motion
to dismiss or in the answer; and every such point of law going to
the whole or a material part of the cause or causes of action stated.
in the bill may be called up and disposed of before final hearing at
the discretion of the court. Every' defense heretofore presentable
by plea in bar or abatement shall be made in the answer and may be
separately heard and disposed of before the trial of the principal
case in the discretion of the court. * * * "
Rule 30 deals with the answer and prescribes its contents. It
provides in, substance; The defendant shall in short and simple
I t
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terms set out his defense to each claim asserted by the bill, he shall
specifically admit, deny or explain the facts upon which the plaintiff
relies unless he is without knowledge, in which case he shall so state,
such statement operating as a denial. Averments other than of
value or amount of damage, if not denied, shall be deemed confessed
except as against an infant, lunatic or other person zon compos
and not under guardianship * * *. The answer may state
as many defenses in the alternative, regardless of consistency, as the
defendant deems essential to his defense. The answer must state
in short and simple form any counter-claim arising out of the trans-
action which is the subject matter of the suit, and may without cross-
bill set out any set-off or counter-claim against the plaintiff which
might be the subject of an independant suit in equity against him
and such set-off or counter-claim so set up, shall have the same ef-
fect as a cross-suit so as to enable the court to pronounce a final
judgement in the same suit both on the original and cross-claims.
Thus the necessity of the cross bill is dispensed with, but is it abol-
ished? The language of the rule would seem clear to the effect
that it is obligatory upon the defendant to set up in his answer and
litigate in that cause any counter-claim he may have arising out of
the subject matter of the suit, but that it js permissible to him, but
not obligatory upon him, to set up and litigate in that cause any
set-off. or counter-claim against the plaintiff which might be the
subject of an independent suit. No reply to the answer is-required,
but the cause shall be deemed at issue on the filing of the answer.
If the answer include a set-off or counter-claim, the party against
whom it is asserted shall reply, and failing to do so within the time
required, shall be in default, whereupon a decree pro confesso on
the counter-claim may be entered. (Rule 31).
Exceptions for insufficiency of An answer are abolished. But if
an answer set up an affirmative defense, set-off or counter-claim,
the plaintiff may upon five days notice, or such further time as the
court may allow, test the sufficiency of the same by motion to strike
out. If found insufficient but amendable, the court may allow an
amendment upon terms or strike out the matter. (Rule 33).
Rule 33 takes the place of former rules 61-65 and provides for a
simpler and speedier mode of testing the sufficiency of the answer.
As to Parties.
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest, but an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an
express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has
been made for the benefit of another, or a party expressly author-
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ized by statute, may sue in his own name without joining with him
the party for whose benefit the action is brought. All persons hav-
ing an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the re-
lief demanded may join as plaintiffs, and any person may be made a
defendant who has or claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff.
Any person may at any time be made a party if his presence is neces-
sary or proper to a complete determination of the cause. Persons
having a united interest must be joined on the same side as plaint-
iffs or defendants, but when any one refuses to join, he may for
such reasons be made a defendant.
Anyone claiming an interest in the litigation may at any time be
permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention
shall be in subordination to and in recognition of, the propriety of
the main proceeding. (Rule 37).
This rule makes a substantial change in the procedure in respect
to parties plaintiff. In the former rules there was no provision re-
quiring that every action should be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest. When the question is of common or general
interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to
make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or
more may sue or defend for the whole. (Rule 38.)
The rule itself is new but the matter embodied in it is not a new
principle of "equity. It is clearer and more explicit than former
:rule 48 which it supersedes.
In all cases where it shall appear to the court that persons who
might otherwise be deemed proper parties to the suit, cannot be
made parties by reason of their being out of the jurisdiction of the
'court, or incapable otherwise of being made parties, or because their
joinder would oust the jurisdiction of the court as to the parties
-before the court, the court niay, in its discretion, proceed in the
cause without making such persons parties; andin such cases the
decree shall be without prejudice to the rights of the absent parties.
(Rule 39.)
This rule is identical with former rule 47 save that it omits the
words "necessary or" before the word "proper." The omission of
the word necessary was designed to eliminate the distinction between
necessary parties and indispensable parties. Parties to a suit in
equity have been classified by the Supreme Court of the United
States into, i. proper parties, 2.-necessary parties, 3. indispensable
-parties-a classification induced by the presence of the word neces-
.sary in former rule 47. The rule, in its present form will eliminate
the forced distinction between necessary parties and indispensable
-parties.
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As to Process.
The rule-day and the appearance-day of the former rules are
abolished. The process of the court is made returnable into the
clerk's office within twenty days from the issuing thereof. (Rule
i2.) The defendant is required to file his answer or other defense
to the bill in the clerk's office within the time named in the sub-
poena as required by rule 12.
As to the Taking of Testimony.
In all trials in equity the testimony of witnesses shall be taken
orally in open court except as otherwise provided by statute or these
rules. The court shall pass upon the admissibility of all evidence
offered, as in actions at law. (Rule 46).
This makes a marked change in respect to trials of equity causes.
Taking the testimony in open court is now 'the rule, taking it before
commissioners is now the exception. Under the former rules, taking
the testimony in a case before commissioners appointed by the court
was the rule; taking it in open court the exception.
Provision is made for the departure from the rule requiring the
testimony of witnesses to be taken orally in open court, when al-
lowed by statute or by order of the court for good and exceptional
cause to be shown by affidavit. All depositions taken under a stat-
ute or under such order of the court shall be taken and filed in the
manner following: Those of the plantiff within sixty days from the
time the cause is at issue; those of the defendant within thirty days
from the expiration of the time for the filing of plaintiff's deposi-
tions; and rebutting depositions by either party within twenty days
after the time for taking original depositions expires.
The manner of taking testimony under the old rules may be
exemplified by what occurred in a given case. A few years ago
railroads operating in Michigan brought suit in the Circuit Court
of the United States for the Western District of Michigan to re-
strain the Auditor General of the state from enforcing against them
the provisions of an Act of the Legislature of Michigan for the
assessment of the property of railroad companies, for the levying
of taxes thereon by the State Board of Assessors and for the col-
lection of such taxes.16
The testimony in the causes was taken by a special commissioner
appointed by the Court, who, with counsel for the respective parties
in attendance, went from place to place in Michigan and in other
30 Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Powers, Auditor General, 2oi U. S. 245. Other cases
x uled by the decision in the above case referred to by their docket titles, Id. 3o2.
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states wherever it was deemed necessary or advisable to examine
witnesses for the purpose of taking the testimony of ,such witnesses.
The commissioner caused the testimonyof the witnesses to be taken
stenographically and subsequently transcribed. The testimony thus
produced was filed in the cause and duly published. The solicitors
made their separate abstracts thereof and caused the same to be
printed for the use of the court on the hearing of the cause. The
commissioner did little else than swear the witnesses and superin-
tend the making up of the certificates. This method of taking tes-
timony was not only attended with great expense (a matter of no
great significance where the parties on one side were railroad com-
panies and on the other side the State of Michigan, but a matter
of great concern to ordinary litigants), but the cost of taking tes-
timony in such a manner is perhaps not the leading objection to the
method. If the facts in the case were involved, and the decision
on them a close question, the court would be deprived of an impor-
ant, and in many ways a controlling, factor in determining how
the question of fact should be decided. It would be deprived of
the opportunity of meeting the witnesses face to face and observ-
ing their conduct and demeanor on the stand; their candor in tes-
tifying, or their lack of candor; their hesitation and evasion. Close
questions of fact, all know, are often determined on appeal out of
no other consideration than that the trial judge saw the witnesses
'and heard them testify, and for that reason the finding of fact will
not be disturbed by the appellate tribunal.
The substantial features of the former rules in relation to taking
testimony by depositions de bene esse have been preserved in the
new rules.
By the provisions of new Rule 55, any deposition or affidavit
taken under these rules, or any other statute, shall be deemed pub-
lished when filed, unless otherwise ordered by the court, which con-
stitutes a wholesome change in the procedure.
As to the Form of Decrees.
A recital in the decree 'of pleadings and evidence and of facts is
rendered unnecessary by Rule 71, which provides as follows:
"In drawing up decrees and orders, neither the bill nor answer,
nor other pleadings, nor any part thereof, nor the report of any
master, nor any other prior proceeding, shall be recited or stated.
in the decree or order; but the decree or order shall begin in sub-
stance as follows: 'This cause came on to be heard (or to be further
heard, as the case may be) at this term and was argued by counsel;
and lhereupon, upon consideration thereof, it was ordered,
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adjudged and decreed as follos, viz.:' (here insert the decree or
order) ."
By the provisions of Rule 73, no preliminary injunction shall be
granted without notice to the opposite party; nor shall any tem-
porary restraining order be granted without notice to the opposite
party, unless it shall clearly appear from specific facts, shown by
affidavit or by a vertified bill, that immediate and irreparable loss and
damage will result to the applicant before the matter can be heard
on notice. In case a temporary restraining order shall be granted
without notice, in the contingency specified, the matter shall be
made returnable at the earliest possible time and in no event later
than ten days from the date of the order, and shall take precedence
of all matters except older matters of the same character.
Rules 75, 76 and 77 relate to the matter of appeal and the record
on appeal. Without going into detail it is sufficient to state that the
purpose of those rules is to reduce the expense and eliminate need-
less recitals and repetition of exhibits and other evidence. Every
practitioner who had occasion to take an appeal under the former
rules had to be constantly on 'his guard lest immaterial matters
should be returned in the appeal and -printed in the record without
serving any more useful purpose, in many instances, than to increase
the ultimate cost of review in the appellate court.
The writer is sensible that he has passed the limits set to this
'article. He is sensible too, that he has omitted many things from
his observations which would be necessary to a complete review of
the subject; but, as heretofore observed, each person must study the
rules himself and compare them with the rules they displace in order
to have a working knowledge of them.
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